Formal security model for virtual machine hypervisors in cloud computing systems by Zegzhda, D. P. & Nikolsky, A. V.
Nonlinear Phenomena in Complex Systems, vol. 17, no. 3 (2014), pp. 253 - 262
Formal Security Model for Virtual Machine Hypervisors in
Cloud Computing Systems
D. P. Zegzhda and A. V. Nikolsky
Saint-Petersburg State Polytechnic University,
29 Politechnicheskaya Str, 195251 Saint-Petersburg, RUSSIA
(Received 27 March, 2014)
The paper describes a formal security model for virtual machine hypervisors in cloud
systems based on the graph theory. This model defines security properties and data access
operations hierarchy inside virtual machines and hypervisors in the cloud. The proposed
model makes it possible to formalize major security issues for cloud systems and define tasks
for hypervisor security and methods to solve them as well as the security condition for the
virtual machine hypervisors.
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1. Introduction
Cloud computing is a widely implemented
and developing business model that provides
users with the access to distributed computing
and information resources as a single service.
However, access to this service can be provided
via the Internet, in the case of public clouds,
and via a local network of the organization,
in the case of private clouds. In both cases,
a user of the cloud service processes data
using temporarily provided computing resources
but can not control the system architecture
in which these resources are located. These
are the main advantages and risks of cloud
computing. When using cloud computing, user
data are transferred to the "cloud" and the
control over the data is lost as the provider
does not bear responsibility for its safety [1].
This significantly complicates the development
and implementation of security systems for cloud
computing, therefore the revision and adaptation
of current security models is required. Security of
a large number of hypervisors running in the cloud
affects significantly the safety of the entire cloud
computing system [1]. It is the hypervisor that
controls operations of several virtual machines,
therefore it is to provide the isolation of virtual
machines from each other and from internal
network components of the cloud. The main
features of the hypervisor virtual machines in
cloud computing systems are as follows:
• use of virtual machines as hosts in the
cloud;
• migration of virtual machines;
• replication of virtual machines;
• storage of virtual machine image files in a
centralized repository;
• ability to connect virtual machines into
isolated virtual networks.
Current models do not always describe these
features of virtual machines operation in the
cloud, so they are not applicable for formalization
of security requirements for cloud computing
systems. The purpose of this paper is to develop
a formal security model for cloud systems, that
will take into account the features of hypervisors
and virtual machines application in the cloud and
identify conditions for hypervisor security in the
clouds.
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2. Review of current models for
cloud computing
Due to rapid development of cloud
computing systems there is a growing number of
mathematical models describing various features
of such systems. Joe Vienman developed an
axiomatic theory and worked out the cloud
computing model based on it [2]. In his work he
put forward one of the most generalized models
for cloud computing. The model proposed by
Vienman is universal and can be applied not
only in the field of information technology, but
also in several other fields (rental cars, electric
networks, logistics and others), which gives it
a major advantage. In this model the cloud is
defined as a structure that meets the following
requirements: it should be 1) general regardless
of the resource type; 2) independent of location;
3) accessible at any time; 4) cost-effective; 5)
available on request. An important role in the
cloud is given to a time variant directed graph.
Nodes of the graph represent sources and resource
consumers in the cloud, and arcs define directed
flows of these resources redistribution. Besides
the graph theory, Vienman cloud model uses
elements from other theories such as Markov
processes and the theory of automated machines.
In terms of the goal set by the authors, the
absence of explicit elements of security systems,
such as access subjects and objects, appears
to be the main disadvantage of this model.
V.Chan and his colleagues in their paper [3]
propose a model based on the graph theory that
enables to describe the behavior of programs
and applications running in the cloud. The
paper focuses on the issues related to testing
applications in the cloud. The vertices of the
graph in this model represent computing nodes
characterized by a variety of attributes, and arcs
in a graph serve as communication links between
computing nodes. The specific feature of this
model is its ability to connect the predicate to
any arc of the graph, which enables to specify
the condition of the resource use in the cloud.
The model does not consider a virtual machine
explicitly, therefore it is not relevant in terms
of the goal set by the authors. Yuingmin Lee
and Omar Boukalma put forward an approach
for diagnosing sources of information flows in
the cloud, based on the system simulation [4].
The paper focuses on security and verification of
cloud computing systems. The proposed model
is based on the Petri nets and allows for secure
communication protocols between various system
components. The model takes into account not
only security features of links between nodes,
but also the safety of the entire cloud system.
However, the features of hypervisors and virtual
machines in cloud computing systems are beyond
the consideration of Lee and Boukalma model.
Huai together with his colleagues in their work
[5] complement the existing model of abstract
state services (AS2s) by formalizing the service
schedule. The application of this extended model
makes it possible to analyze real sequence of
operations explicitly carried out by the service.
The article proposes service schedules in the form
of regular expressions based on Kleene algebra.
However, this paper discusses only cloud services
leaving out various options for networking in
the cloud. Thomas and his colleagues developed
not only a model but also a system to simulate
cloud networks [6]. Using the developed platform
and software for its simulation, they confirmed
the accuracy of their hypothesis: the cloud
computing capacity will be used more efficiently
if the service provider and a user are given
the opportunity to select or change scheduling
and computation distribution algorithms within
the user resources, in addition to usual cloud
services. The proposed model deals with the cloud
system as a graph that consists of computing
resources and communication links between
them. Each resource and each link are specified
by speed characteristics. The formalization of the
computational concepts enabled the authors to
check effectiveness of different ways of computing
resources distribution in the cloud. However, this
approach does not enable to analyze security
of the system as it leaves out the concepts
of subjects and objects in the model. Thus,
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graph theory enables to describe in detail a
complex cloud structure with lots of network
hosts and computing resources. However, the
proper analysis of cloud systems safety requires
a model that takes into account explicit features
of hypervisors and virtual machines.
3. Formal security model of cloud
computing
The proposed formal model of cloud
computing system security focuses on
hypervisors, virtual machines and their
relationship with each other and other system
components. Virtual machines and virtualization
technology play a key role in cloud computing
systems. Software platforms (e.g., VMware
vSphere, Xen Cloud platform), based on
cloud systems, define procedures and rules
for interaction between hosts inside the cloud
network [4]. Modern data processing centers
based on cloud computing systems, can comprise
up to thousands of hosts inside the cloud
network. Each host performs a certain function
in the cloud. Among the functions applicable
for network hosts in the cloud, there are several
major functions typical for all cloud computing
systems. User data are located on multiple hosts
inside the cloud network, called a storage. Users
in the cloud get indirect access to their data
through intermediaries - the virtual machines
regardless of the way the service is provided
(IaaS, PaaS or SaaS). Some of the hosts in the
cloud internal network carry out functions of
control systems: accounting and allocation of
resources, development and control of virtual
machines, centralized control of the network
hosts inside the cloud. Most often, there is only
one host responsible for all these functions, that
is the controller. Most of the entire cloud internal
network is taken by the worker hosts whose
main function is to provide the operation of
several virtual machines carrying out calculations
requested by users. Thus, we can define a set R
of all possible functions for the cloud internal
network. This set contains the following elements:
• VmHost is a host with the hypervisor
providing its hardware resources to
multiple virtual machines;
• Storage is a host representing the database
and storing user data as well as virtual
machine images, virtual machine templates
or program images;
• Controller is a control center responsible
for supervising, monitoring and performing
other functions necessary for the operation
of the cloud internal network.
{V mJost, Storage, Controller} ⊆ R
As the network inside the cloud is actually a
standard computer network, it can be represented
by an undirected graph CL = (N, η), where N =
{ni} is a set of hosts inside the cloud network,
η ⊆ N × N is a set of facets of the graph
indicating the authorized network connections
between network hosts. η is determined by the
physical network connections as well as settings
of firewalls running in the cloud internal network.
So, the function Role assigns a set of roles
to each host: Role : N→P (R). In large data
processing centers each host performs only one
role (∀n ∈ N, |Role(n)| = 1), though the software
for cloud computing systems enables to assign
several different roles to one host (e.g. the role
of the control center and the storage at the same
host). Let us denote the set of all virtual machines
in the cloud as follows: V = {νi}. Similarly to the
cloud internal network graph we can build the
network graph formed by the virtual machines
in the cloud: CV = (Vυ), where υ ⊆ V × V is
a set of authorized virtual network connections
between virtual machines. υ is determined by the
settings of virtual networks in the cloud. Any
element of N is the hardware for running software
in cloud computing system (including operating
systems, hypervisors and database management
systems). This software implements a network
protocol stack (generally, TCP/IP), thereby
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forming an independent host inside the cloud
network. Each virtual machine on the VmHost
host implements its own network protocol stack
making virtual machines independent of network
hosts. Connecting virtual machines with the cloud
internal network hosts from set N , we introduce
the concept of "machine". We denote the set of
all machines in the cloud as M ⊆ V ∪N = {mi}.
So, the full graph of the cloud network can be
determined as follows: C = (M, c), where c ⊆M×
M and c ⊆ η∪υ. Thus, the model comprises three
graphs: CL, CV and C. CL, being a connected
graph, represents the hardware resources of the
cloud and the relationships between them. This
graph is a core one and enables the cloud
computing system to provide users with an access
to various services through the external network.
IaaS cloud service users interact with the sets of
virtual machines connected into isolated virtual
networks. Consequently, the graph CV will not
be connected in this case. It should be noted
that graph CV will be isolated from graph CL
(∀νj ∈ V : ¬∃ni ⊂ N : (νj , ni) ∈ c) in case there
is no networking between virtual machines and
the cloud internal network, which is typical for
public clouds.
3.1. Virtual machines in the cloud
Apart from networking in column C, there
are other connections formed through the use
of virtualization technology between the set of
virtual machines V and N-cloud internal network
hosts. Any virtual machine can be represented
as a regular file (or a set of files), i.e. a virtual
machine image. The image file of the virtual
machine can store its copy of RAM as well as
hard disk image and additional settings. Each
virtual machine in the cloud has its own image
file located in the storage. The virtual machine
image file can be distributed across multiple hosts
in the network instead of being stored on one
host. If the virtual machine is running, it runs on
one of the worker hosts. If the virtual machine
is not in operation, it is still present in the
cloud as an image file. A virtual machine can
have the replication function, which allows for
rapid recovery of virtual machines in case of a
host failure.Let us formalize these relationships
as follows:
• H ⊆ V ×N is a set of pairs (νi, ni), where νi
is a virtual machine running on a node hi
inside the cloud network. This set defines
all virtual machines currently running in
the cloud and corresponds to the following:
V mHost ∈ Role(hi);
• I ⊆ V×P (N) is a set of pairs (νi, Si), where
νi is a virtual machine and Si is a set of
all nodes in the cloud network to store the
image file of the virtual machine with the
condition ∀si ∈ Si, Storage ∈ Role(si);
• F ⊆ V × P (O) is a set of pairs (νi, Oνi),
where νi is a virtual machine and Oνi is
a set of files (from the set of all objects in
the systemO), which represent the image of
the virtual machine in the cloud. All these
files can be distributed over multiple hosts
of the set I in the network;
• R ⊆ V × P (N) is a set of pairs (νi, Ti),
where νi is a virtual machine and Ti is
a set of hosts inside the cloud network
with the replication function for this virtual
machine, which follows the condition: ∀ti ∈
Ti, V mHost ∈ Role(ti).
Let us denote the set of all programs in the cloud
as P = {pi}. Software running on host mi may be
represented as Pmi = {pmij }, with the following
condition: P ⊆ ⋃Pmi . Assuming that Soft ⊆
M × P (P ) is a set of connections between the
machines in the cloud and the programs running
on them we can introduce two subsets in this set:
• SoftN ⊆ N × P (P ) ⊂ Soft is a set of
programs running on the hosts inside the
cloud network;
• SoftV ⊆ V × P (P ) ⊂ Soft is a set of
programs running in virtual machines in
the cloud.
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Virtual machine is an abstraction created by the
hypervisor software, which is a program that runs
on the host hypervisor:
∀(νi, hj) ∈ H, νi ∈ V, hj ∈ N :
∃Pnj ⊂ P, (ηj , Pnj ) ⊆ SoftN ∧ νi ∈ Pnj
It can be stated that V ⊆ P . It should be noted
that a set of programs P contains not only the
programs currently running in the cloud, but also
images of the programs stored in the template
files of virtual machines that are used to create
new virtual machines in the cloud. Therefore, if
the virtual machine νi is not running on any host
in the network cloud (@hj ∈ N : (νi, hj) ∈ H),
then it is still the program (νi ∈ P ), but in the
form of its image.
3.2. Objects and users in the cloud
Before formalizing the state of a cloud
computing system it is necessary to introduce
safety-related system definitions. We can use
definitions from [7] adapting them to the cloud
systems:
• U = {ui} is a set of users in the cloud;
• S = {si} is a set of objects in the cloud. The
set of objects in the cloud is determined by
the software P ;
• Id ⊆ U×P (S) is an identification set. This
is a set of of pairs, assigning each user in the
cloud to the set of all their subjects;
• Imp ⊆ P × S is an impersonation set. It
assigns each program running in the cloud
to the only entity that determines its rights
in the system.
Using these sets in the proposed cloud model
makes it possible to take into account security
issues within the cloud.
3.3. The security model of cloud
computing
The state of the cloud computing
system can be represented as a tuple:
ψ = (C,P, U, S,H, I,R, Soft, Id, Im), where:
• C is a graph representing all network
connections between all hosts inside the
cloud network and virtual machines;
• P is a set of all programs in the cloud and
virtual machines;
• U is a set of all users of the cloud;
• S is a set of all objects in the cloud;
• H, I,R, Soft, Id, Im are sets of tuples that
define the current relationship between
users, programs, objects and network hosts
in the cloud.
With these definitions we can represent any
cloud computing system in the form of a finite
state machine Ω = (Ψ, ψ0, τ), where Ψ is a
set of all system states with ψ0 ∈ Ψ being the
initial state of the system, and τ : Ψ → Ψ is
a function of the system transition from one
state to another. One of the main features of the
cloud provided by the virtualization technology
is the migration of virtual machines between
different network hosts in the cloud during
their operation. This virtualization function is
referred to as live migration [8]. The virtual
machine migration causes set H to change
with time. Migration can be represented in the
proposed model as an operation of the cloud
computing system state changes (from state
ψ to state ψ˜), with the following assignments:
H ψ˜=Hψ\(νi, nj)∪(νi, nk), νi∈V ψ, nj∈Nψ, nk∈Nψ
ψ=(Cψ, Pψ, Uψ, Sψ, Hψ, Iψ, Rψ, Softψ, Idψ, Imψ)
ψ˜=(Cψ˜, P ψ˜, U ψ˜, Sψ˜, H ψ˜, I ψ˜, Rψ˜, Softψ˜, Idψ˜, Imψ˜)
Thus, the proposed model allows us to describe
the basic features of hypervisors and virtual
machines in the cloud such as:
• use of virtual machines as hosts in the cloud
is expressed as V ⊆M ;
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• migration of virtual machines
is expressed in the model as
H ψ˜=Hψ\(νi, nj)∪(νi, nk), νi∈V ψ, nj∈Nψ,
nk∈Nψ;
• replication of virtual machines is expressed
in the model as R ⊆ V × P (N);
• distribution of the storage environment
and performance of virtual machines is
described as:
∀(νi, Si)∈I : @ni⊂N : V mHost∈Role(nj);
• the capability to connect virtual machines
into isolated virtual networks is provided
with a separate disconnected graph Cν .
Connecting cloud computing network and virtual
machines in a single graph makes it possible to
use the mathematical apparatus of the theory of
graphs for the more detailed simulation of cloud
systems. Moreover, with the proposed model,
we can work out the rules and security policies
that impose restrictions on the virtual machines
and programs and the hosts inside the cloud
network. Thus, the requirement for the absence
of networking between the virtual machines in
the cloud and the hosts inside the cloud can be
described as follows: ∀νj ∈ V : @ ni ⊂ N :
(νj , ni) ∈ c.
4. Hypervisor security in the
cloud
As it was mentioned above, any virtual
machine is a program running under the control
of a hypervisor with each virtual machine running
the programs. These statements can be written as
follows:{
V ⊆ P ;
∀νj ∈ V : ∃Pνj ⊂ P, (νj , Pνj ).
These statements imply:
∀(νi, nj) ∈H, νi∈V, nj ∈N, (νi, Pνi) ∈ Soft, pνi ∈Pνi :
∃(u, Su)∈Im, u∈U, Su⊂S, {sν , sn}⊂Su, (νi, sn)∈Id ∧ (pνi , sν)∈Id.
This means that any user u in the cloud is
assigned to at least two different subjects:
• sν is a subject that is assigned to program
pνi running in the virtual machine νi.
Subject sν is involved in the security system
inside the virtual machine νi (security in
the operating system);
• sn is a subject that is assigned to program
νi running on host nj . Subject sn is
involved in security system running on host
nj (hypervisor security).
It should be noted that access rights of
these two subjects are controlled by two different
security systems. Access to the resource is
provided on behalf of the subject sn. Hypervisor
is responsible for the operations performed by
the software within the virtual machine using
a variety of other operations performed by the
software on host nj .
4.1. The hierarchy of data access
operations from the virtual machine in the
cloud computing systems
Hard disks of virtual machines in cloud
computing systems are often stored on separate
servers in the cloud, rather than on the hypervisor
host, with the access to hard disks provided only
via network [9]. This means that for each access
to a virtualized disk from a virtual machine you
must perform a number of operations to access a
file on a remote server from the internal cloud
Нелинейные явления в сложных системах Т. 17, № 3, 2014
Formal Security Model for Virtual Machine Hypervisors in Cloud Computing Systems 259
network. The virtualized disk is represented in
the cloud computing system as an integral part
of a virtual machine image stored as a file or a
set of files in the central repository inside the
cloud network. Consequently, the direct access to
data will be carried out by the software running
on the central repository. Let us consider this
in more detail and introduce some definitions:
νi is a virtual machine that provides access to
the file; f is the file located on the virtual hard
disk which is being accessed; pνi is a program
that provides access from a virtual machine; nr
is a centralized repository storing the virtual
machine image. We denote data access operation
performed by the program pνi as opν . In order to
perform this operation the program pνi accesses
the operating system running inside the virtual
machine νi. A security subsystem in the operating
system first gets access control for this operation
using subject sν (which corresponds to program
pνi). If the operation is enabled, the operating
system performs a set of low-level operations
{opνi } to copy the data to a virtual device (the
virtual hard disk with file f). Low-level operations
including the interaction with hardware IO ports
and DMA transaction processing are performed
by the file system drivers. All these operations
are carried out at the privileged level inside
the virtual machine and do not use object f .
Instead, hardware I/O ports and memory areas
are the objects of these operations. Hypervisor
controlling a virtual machine νi performs a set
of data access operations {ophi } implemented in
the storage device emulators (on the virtual hard
disk) for all operations from the set {opνi }. It
should be noted that all operations from set
{ophi } are performed directly on the host inside
the cloud network as they need to get access to
the real (non-virtualized) hardware. Therefore, all
operations from the set {ophi } are performed using
subject sn (corresponding to the program of a
virtual machine νi) and go through the control
system in the hypervisor. The composition of the
set of operations {ophi } depends on the settings
and the specific implementation of the hypervisor.
Since the virtual hard disk image of the virtual
machine is stored in the repository, the following
conditions are fulfilled: ∃ Tν : nr ∈ Tν ∧ (νi, Tν) ∈
I and ∃Wν : {fνi } ⊆ Wν ∧ (νi,Wν) ∈ F , where
nr is the host storing the image of the virtual
machine hard disk (represented as a set of files
{fνi } ⊆ O). Then, there is a subject sr on
whose behalf the access to the virtual machine
image files is provided on the remote server nr.
Thus, the operations {ophi }are responsible for
data exchange over the network, using the link
(ni, nr) ∈ η in the graph CL. These actions
result in the set of operations {opγi } for data
access of the image of the virtual machine νi
performed on the host. The given example shows
that the user in the cloud computing system may
be assigned to at least three different subjects
{sν , sn, sr}, which correspond to three different
programs {pν , νi, pr} (pr is a program running on
host nr and providing access to a virtual machine
image data), which, in their turn, are running
in three different environments {νi, ni, nr}. Low-
level operations from the set {opνi } are not
controlled by any security system, instead they
generate two sets of operations: {ophi } and {opγi }.
Thus, we can build a hierarchy of IO operations
in the cloud computing system to access the file
on the disk from the virtual machine (Table 1).
So, when the virtualization technology is applied
in cloud computing systems the hierarchy of
access operations takes on a specific feature: all
operations performed in the hypervisor by the
virtual machine device emulators are authorized
with the user’s rights of the virtual machine
program in the hypervisor, but not with the user’s
rights of the program within the virtual machine.
4.2. Hypervisor security issues in the
cloud computing systems
One data access operation within a virtual
machine generates a sequence of other data
access operations in the hypervisor on a remote
server, which changes the subject, object and
the type of the access. The interaction of the
client and server programs in the network can
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Table 1: Hierarchy of access operations to the disk file from a virtual machine in the cloud
Operating
environment
Program Operations Object Object identifer Subject
νi-virtual
machine
pν op
ν f -file on the
virtual disk
file name on the
virtual disk
sν
νi-virtual
machine
kernel of the
operating
system in a
virtual machine
{opνi } disk sectors
or memory
areas
file corresponding
sector numbers on a
virtual disk
operating
system
kernel
ni-worker
host
νi {ophi } f˜ -network
socket
socket number
corresponding to
the server with
storage
sn
ni-worker
host
hypervisor on a
worker host
operations of
interaction
with the
network card
device on a
worker host
memory
areas and
a network
interface
network address
of the server with
storage
hypervisor
nr-server
storage
of virtual
machine
images
pr {opγi } {fνi }-virtual
disk
image filename of
a virtual machine
hard disk
sr
nr-server
storage
of virtual
machine
images
operating
system
kernel on
the repository
operations of
interaction
with the
information
storage
device on
the repository
disk sectors
and memory
areas
sector numbers on
the virtual disk
corresponding to
the sector numbers
on the hard disk
operating
system
kernel
cause a similar situation. In the process of
interaction over the network the subject on the
client side and the server side belong to the
same user as the identification and authentication
network mechanisms are used. In the case of
virtualization the operating system in a virtual
machine monitors the implementation of data
access operations of different users at the level
of the processes inside, and the hypervisor host
system does not control these operations because
it provides the virtual machine operation as a
single program running for one user. This can
result in two system states that can be used to
carry out attacks on the virtualization system
[10]. In the first case, if the cloud computing
system is used by the SaaS users, it can provoke
the situation in which two users work in the
same virtual machine, while the direct data access
operations will be performed on behalf of one
subject (the one assigned to the virtual machine
which is running on a worker host). Consequently,
many different users in a virtual machine may be
assigned to the subject on the host system, which
does not correspond to any of these users:
∃(u1, Su1) ∈ Im, (u2, Su2) ∈ Im, u1, u2 ∈ U, Su1,
Su2 ⊂ S, sν1 ∈ Su1, sν2 ∈ Su2,
{(pν1, sν1), (pν2, sν2)} ⊂ Id, (νi, Pνi) ∈ Soft,
{pν1, pν2} ∈ Pνi , (νi, sn) ∈ Id, sn 6∈ Su1 ∧ sn 6∈ Su2.
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The second problem can arise if the set
of virtualization facilities such as Xen or KVM,
implements abstraction of the virtual machine
using multiple components running on behalf of
different subjects. For example, in KVM any
virtual machine can run in the user mode, but,
for a number of operations performed by the
software in a virtual machine, a special emulator
process qemu, running with the administrator
rights of the host system, is used [11]. Thus,
part of the processes initiated by the user in
a virtual machine will be run on behalf of the
administrator of the host system. Consequently,
the non-privileged user in a virtual machine can
get more privileges in the host system [12]. In the
framework of the proposed model this situation
can be expressed as follows:
∃(u1, Su1) ∈ Im, u1 ∈ U, Su1 ⊂ S, sν1 ∈ Su1,
(pν1, sν1) ∈ Id, (νi, Pνi) ∈ Soft,
(νi, sn) ∈ Id, sn ∈ Su1.
Summarizing, we can assert that if the
subject inside a virtual machine has the access
to virtual resources related to the image of the
virtual machine, the access to these resources will
be controlled only at the level of the operating
system inside the virtual machine, and the access
operations will be carried out in another runtime
without the access control. In order to ensure the
safety of the hypervisor and virtual machines in
cloud computing we need to solve the following
problems:
• authorization and access control of all user
requests to the cloud system resources from
within the virtual machine;
• minimization of the privileges of device
emulators that provide the access of the
virtual machine to the resources in the
cloud or hypervisor.
To solve the first problem we suggest using
network protocols with the authentication of
access to cloud resources and placing these
resources outside the virtual machine. In this case,
programs processing SaaS queries and running
inside the virtual machine will not be able to
modify or read any local data of the virtual
machine they operate in, but they will be able to
perform queries to an FTP server or the database
running inside the cloud. To solve the second
problem we propose to isolate all device emulators
that provide access to the cloud resources (e.g.,
hard disk emulators) within the processes running
with fewer privileges. In the case of attack at
device emulators thereby isolated the violator
can not affect the operation of the hypervisor
or access the internal cloud network. So, we
can formulate the security condition for cloud
computing systems: device emulators that provide
access to the cloud resources must be enabled with
the privileges of the related virtual machine user,
and all requests to the cloud resources from the
virtual
5. Conclusions
The proposed formal model of the virtual
machine hypervisor security in cloud computing
systems enables to describe cloud systems entities
and relationships between them as well as the
process of the cloud functioning in terms of
security. It describes the security of the hypervisor
basic functions and the operations with virtual
machine, such as migration and replication of
virtual machines, placement of virtual machines
images on the repository and representation of
the virtual machine as a program and as a
network host. The analysis of the hierarchy of
data access operations from the virtual machine
in the cloud computing system enabled to identify
and describe two main hypervisor security flaws
in cloud computing systems in terms of the
proposed model: the inability to identify requests
for access to the cloud resources outside the
virtual machine, and the elevated privileges in
the hypervisor when processing I/O requests from
the virtual machine. Consequently, in the view
of the need to eliminate these deficiencies, we
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formulated hypervisor security issues in cloud
computing systems, proposed the solutions, and
formulated the condition of the system security
for cloud computing, the observance of which
will ensure the invariance of the user’s authority
within the virtual machine and beyond the cloud
environment. The proposed model can be used as
a formal basis for setting the criteria of security
policies for cloud computing systems, restrictions
on migration and replication functions as well
as on the access to the software and virtual
machines.
References
[1] P.Zegzhda, D.Zegzhda, A.Karetnikov. Cloud
computing. Virtual safety or virtualization? In:
Proceedings of the Conference "RusCrypto-2012
, Moscow 28–31 march 2012. [Electronic resource]
http://www.ruscrypto.ru/sources/conference/
rc2012/
[2] D.Vienman. Axiomatic theory of clouds.
[electronic resource] Slave. Doc, july 2011.
http://www.joeweinman.com/Resources/
Joe_Weinman_Axiomatic_Cloud_Theory.pdf
[3] W.K. Chan, L. Mei, Z. Zhang. Modeling
and testing of cloud applications. (IEEE
APSCC, Singapore, 2009). Also at
http://www.cs.cityu.edu.hk/∼wkchan/papers/
apscc2009-chan+mei+zhang
[4] I. Lee, O. Bukelma. Model of CPN origin
workflow: Towards diagnosis in the cloud
[electronic resource]. http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-
789/paper6.pdf
[5] H. Ma, K. Scheve, Talheym B., C. Wang. A
formal model of collaboration in serving the
clouds. SOCA, vol. 6, no. 3. (Springer, 2012).
Also at http://cdcc.faw.jku.at/pdf/get.php?f=
FM_Cloud.pdf&d=/public/publications
[6] T. Henzinger et al. FlexPRICE: flexible
resourcing with the cloud [electronic resource].
http://pub.ist.ac.at/∼wies/papers/flexprice.pdf
[7] P.Zegzhda, D.Zegzhda. Methodology of dynamic
protection. In: Proceedings of the International
Conference on Security and Counter Terrorism.
(MTNMO, Moscow, 2006).
[8] K. Clarke et al. Live migration of virtual
machines. Eds. K. Clark and [etc.]
(University of Cambridge, 2005). Also at
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/srg/netos/
papers/2005-nsdi-migration.pdf
[9] M.T. Jones. Anatomy of cloud storage
infrastructure. (IBM, 2010). Also at
http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/cloud/
library/cl-cloudstorage/cl-cloudstorage-pdf.pdf
[10] P. Zegzhda, D. Zegzhda, A. Karetnikov. Security
of cloud computing systems. Problems and
prospects. In: INFOFORUM, 7 february 2012.
(MiFi Publishing House, Moscow, 2011). P. 116-
118.
[11] D.P. Berrange. Taking full advantage of
QEMU userspace Xen. Conf. Xen Summit,
november 2007. [electronic resource].
http://people.redhat.com/berrange/xen-
summit-2007-sj/xen-summit-xenite-report.pdf;
http://people.redhat.com/berrange/xen-
summit-2007-sj/xen-summit-xenite-report.pdf
[12] N. Elhage. Virtunoid: Guest mode KVM.
Escalation of existing committers to host. Conf.
Black Hat, 2011. [electronic resource] http:
//media.blackhat.com/bh-us-11/Elhage/
BH_US_11_Elhage_Virtunoid_WP.pdf
[13] Cloud computing. Merits, risks and
recommendations for information security. Eds.
D. Katteddu, G.Hokben; (ENISA, 2009). Also at
http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/risk-
management/files/deliverables/
cloud-computing-risk-
assessment/at_download/fullReport
Нелинейные явления в сложных системах Т. 17, № 3, 2014
